STATE OF OHIO
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

Terrorism Incident Response Annex

COORDINATING AGENCY
Ohio Department of Public Safety, Ohio Homeland Security

PRIMARY AGENCY
Ohio Department of Public Safety, Ohio Homeland Security
Ohio State Highway Patrol
STATE OF OHIO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

TERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE ANNEX

COORDINATING AGENCY: Ohio Department of Public Safety, Ohio Homeland Security (OHS)

Primary Agencies: Ohio Department of Public Safety, Ohio Homeland Security (OHS)
Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP)

Support Agencies: Ohio Adjutant General’s Department – Ohio National Guard (OHNG)
Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA)
Ohio Department of Health (ODH)
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

1. This plan:
   a. Presents an overview of the terrorism-related hazards that potentially face Ohio.
   b. Describes State-level agency capabilities and expertise that exist to address those hazards during response operations.
   c. Provides an outline of the concept of operations that will be employed in response to terrorism incidents.
   d. Provides an outline of the assignment of responsibilities of State Agencies (listed above) that are partner to this Plan that will be applied to the response to terrorism-related incidents that occur within the State.

B. Scope

1. This Plan applies to all acts or threats of terrorism that could have serious impacts on the State and its population. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “...the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civil population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives”. Chapter 2909.21 of the Ohio Revised Code (ORC) further defines “Acts of Terrorism” applicable to Ohio.

2. A terrorism-related incident that occurs in Ohio will require immediate local-, state- and federal-level actions to be initiated. Response to any terrorism-related incident will follow the operational priorities of:
a. Protection of life, safety and stabilization of incident environment(s)

b. Investigation of incident causes and impacts.

c. Victim care and assistance.

d. Restoration of property and the infrastructural environment

3. When possible, State agency responses to terrorism-related impacts will be through already-established assignments of responsibility in other Ohio EOP elements.

4. Response to terrorism-related incidents will be centered on and geared toward enabling responding organizations to recognize the situation, rapidly and effectively exchange data, initiate and direct responses, and enable other offices to determine and prepare their roles in subsequent recovery-related actions.

5. Command and control over terrorism-related incidents will remain with the lowest-possible jurisdictional level before, during, and after FBI involvement.

6. Presidential Decision Directive 39, the U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 1995, designates the FBI as the lead agency for federal domestic terrorism response actions, with assistance furnished by state and local governments as required. If an event is determined to be an act of terrorism, federal resources will be available in support of operations in Ohio. These may include specialists from an FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), HAZMAT, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), or other fields as required. Their availability will be coordinated by the FBI and the State Emergency Operations Center (State EOC).

7. The Ohio Department of Public Safety, Division of Ohio Homeland Security (OHS) is the lead agency for collecting, analyzing, maintaining, and disseminating information and intelligence to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, and private organizations in detecting, deterring, preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from threatened or actual terrorist events.

The information that is gathered in this effort is not a public record under ORC §149.43 Am. Sub. S. B. No. 9.47., ORC §149.433 (A)(1)(2)(a)(b)(c), and ORC §5502.03(B) further states that OHS will develop and coordinate policies, protocols, and strategies that may be used to prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist acts or threats; and that OHS will coordinate efforts of state and local governments and private organizations to enhance the security and protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in this state.

7. Any person, facility, area, institution, or installation within Ohio could be a potential target of terrorism. Ohio has developed a list of Critical Facilities within the state.
This list is maintained as a “Security Record” in accordance with Ch. 149.433 (ORC). Increased security measures with regard to these facilities will be taken automatically in conjunction with changes to various terrorism threat levels. These measures will be addressed in specific action plans which will also be developed and maintained as “Security Records”. Changes or additions to such security measures will be recommended by the State Homeland Security Advisor to the governor based on current intelligence from the State Fusion Center and its partners.

II. SITUATION

A. Prevention consists of those activities that serve to prevent, avoid or stop an imminent, threatened or actual act of terrorism against Ohio, its citizens and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators’ chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators’ access to resources.

B. Prevention actions that are undertaken are important regardless of the type of threat, adversary capability, or time or location of an incident. These actions may be those that are routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they investigate traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.

C. Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack.

D. The consequences (or cascading effects) of terrorism could outlast or surpass an initiating event. Effects may include long-term health and medical problems, extended economic issues, or political and social concerns.

E. Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary action categories: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination.

F. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security will communicate critical information about imminent or elevated terrorist threats by issuing a National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alert. These alerts provide timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector. NTAS Bulletins describe current developments or general trends regarding threats of terrorism. NTAS Elevated Alerts warn of a credible threat against the United States. NTAS Imminent Alerts warn of credible, specific and impending terrorism threats against the United States.

Using available information, the alerts will provide a concise summary of the potential threat, information about actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended
steps that individuals, communities, businesses and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate or respond to the threat.

G. Credible threats are those based upon accrued intelligence and evidence that indicate an act of terrorism is imminent or has occurred. Credible threat information may further indicate the use or presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

H. Primary Statewide Fusion Center – Ohio Homeland Security’s Statewide Terrorism Analysis and Crime Center (STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit) coordinates the collection, analysis, maintenance, and dissemination of information and intelligence up to the secret level to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, and private organizations in detecting, deterring, preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from threatened or actual terrorist events. The STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit can also aid in coordinating the efforts of state and local governments and private organizations to enhance the security and protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in Ohio.

I. The Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) serves as the State’s statewide cybersecurity center, where partners from the state, local, federal, and private sector will share important cybersecurity information, up to the secret level; address ongoing threats; and work directly with the OHS Infrastructure Protection Unit to better protect key resources; and help educate the public on cybersecurity best-practices.

J. Laboratory Testing – Plans to augment the capacity of human, animal, plant and food health laboratories include having access to electronic information systems that send and receive test results in compliance with the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) Functional Area for Connecting Laboratory, Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), and National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) Systems. Response networks support surge capacity nationwide.

Laboratory networks that address human, animal, plant and food testing include:

a. Department of Defense’s Laboratory Network (DoD)
b. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Laboratory Response Network (CDC)
c. United States Department of Agriculture’s National Animal Health Laboratory Network (USDA)
d. USDA’s National Plant Diagnostic Network (USDA)
e. USDA and US Food and Drug Administration’s Food Emergency Response Network (USDA/FDA)
f. US Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental Response Laboratory Network (EPA)
g. FDA’s Veterinary Laboratory Investigation & Response Network (FDA)

K. Types of Chemical Agents
   a. Biotoxins—poisons that come from plants or animals;
   b. Blister agents/vesicants—chemicals that severely blister the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin on contact
   c. Blood agents—poisons that affect the body by being absorbed into the blood;
   d. Caustics (acids)—chemicals that burn or corrode people’s skin, eyes, and mucus membranes (lining of the nose, mouth, throat, and lungs) on contact;
   e. Choking/lung/pulmonary agents—chemicals that cause severe irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract (lining of the nose and throat, lungs);
   f. Incapacitating agents—drugs that make people unable to think clearly or that cause an altered state of consciousness (possibly unconsciousness);
   g. Long-acting anticoagulants—poisons that prevent blood from clotting properly, which can lead to uncontrolled bleeding;
   h. Metals—agents that consist of metallic poisons; Nerve agents—highly poisonous chemicals that work by preventing the nervous system from working properly;
   i. Organic solvents—agents that damage the tissues of living things by dissolving fats and oils; Riot control agents/tear gas—highly irritating agents normally used by law enforcement for crowd control or by individuals for protection (e.g., mace);
   j. Toxic alcohols—poisonous alcohols that can damage the heart, kidneys, and nervous system; and Vomiting agents—chemicals that cause nausea and vomiting.

L. In the case of the accidental or intentional release of a chemical agent, in addition to affected individuals, there will be many worried well. It can be anticipated that up to 25% of the worried well population may also require testing. It will be difficult to determine the proportion of the population that will be classified as the worried-well, but it is a good assumption that a large proportion of the worried-well will request testing.
M. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE)

1. Applicable situations for CBRNE events include explosive devices, hazardous materials tank explosions, biological and toxic releases, nuclear devices, radiological dispersals, as well as arson/explosive related fires.

2. CBRNE detection addresses biological agents, and may employ the testing of medical or plant samples via blood and medical tests. Medical and syndromic surveillance are critical in the detection of biological agents, as well as in food and agriculture safety. To be effective, close integration of this set of activities must occur within CBRNE Detection actions.

3. Large-Scale CBRNE Events

   a. The main incident prevention strategy will be to use detection technologies and screening processes to interdict CBRNE materials before they are used. The alternative strategy will be to rely on existing detection technology, law enforcement investigations and alternate technologies to determine the presence of threat devices.

   b. A national capability to address large CBRNE events has been developed through the design and deployment of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture framework. The framework was designed to detect (through technical and non-technical means), analyze, and report on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006 mandated the creation of the framework, and charged the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with coordinating its development and implementing its domestic component.

   c. The State and its local jurisdictions will seek to develop and implement detection capabilities through use of DHS grants and guidance.

   d. Develop equipment, training and communications standards to facilitate and validate the deployment and use of detection technologies.

4. CBRNE Assignments of Responsibility for Detection and Reporting

   a. The assignments of responsibility for CBRNE detection and reporting in response to a terrorism incident are addressed in ESF-10, Oil, Gas and Hazardous Materials. These responsibilities may include:

      i. Conduct CBRNE detection and confirmation screening of manufacturing operations that are intended for illegal manufacture and/or use.
ii. Conduct CBRNE detection operations at key transportation points and detect CBRNE material on people or items entering/boarding events, aircraft, mass transit, or other high impact targets.

iii. Inspect and monitor cargo at key interdiction points for potential CBRNE material.

iv. Provide CBRNE samples to relevant entities (i.e., public health or animal health laboratories, law enforcement, forensic laboratories, etc.) for additional assessments, as necessary.

v. Coordinate and transmit CBRNE material threat and discovery information with intelligence, public safety, public health and other appropriate agencies.

N. Explosive Device Response Operations

1. Coverage by Bomb Squad Teams

   a. Coverage of high-density population and critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) locations by Type I-level bomb squad teams is critical to the adequate protection of these assets and resources.

   b. For locations that are not covered by a Type I-level team, Type II- and III-level teams may be combined to create a Type I-level team or assets may be accessed via other means. In some cases, this could result in a response delay.

   c. All situations will be assessed by the bomb technician on the scene as to time sensitive considerations. Safety issues will take precedence over time considerations.

   d. In a catastrophic level Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) situation where full remote capabilities are available, it is desired to have the technological potential for diagnostics and execution of the disruption tools within one hour from time of arrival on the scene.

2. Response to Large Vehicle Bombs

   a. Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIED) will require a response from a Type II team minimum, plus Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) training and equipment that meets standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB).

3. Response to Suicide Bombing(s)

   a. Effective response times to suicide bombers are directly related to threat identification and the communicative chain to dispatch.
b. Response timelines to suicide bombers are dependent on the location of the event relative to the placement of the response resources.

c. Response to suicide bombers will be more effective if a system is in place to ensure the timely receipt of intelligence or device information to assist those responding to the threat.

d. Bomb Squad – A bomb response organization consists of at least one bomb response team (see the definition of a “bomb response team”), accredited by the FBI Hazardous Devices School to standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.

e. Bomb Response Team – A sub-unit within a bomb squad, consisting of at least two certified bomb technicians and a full set of equipment meeting minimum standards for bomb squad operations. Military EOD units are not currently resource typed within National Incident Management System (NIMS) but are available to respond to incidents in the community either to assist the “accredited” bomb squad, or respond to the incident in an area without State/local bomb squad presence.

O. The assignments of responsibility for WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination in response to a terrorism incident are addressed in ESF-10, Oil, Gas and Hazardous Materials; in the Catastrophic Incident Response Annex (CIRA); and Tab A to the CIRA, the Improvised Nuclear Device Response Plan (IND).

1. ESF-10 addresses the following actions during responses to hazardous materials incidents:

a. Providing resource support to local jurisdictions as requested.

b. Coordination of state-level and non-governmental organizations in support of local response.

c. Coordination with federal agencies through the National Response Framework (NRF), including the NRF ESF-10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP, 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300).

d. Providing protective action recommendations to local jurisdictions.

e. Assessment of the health effects of a hazardous material release.

f. Sampling of air, water, soil, and other materials to test for contamination.

g. Assistance in recovery and mitigation.
2. Under the CIRA:

a. The organization of response to catastrophic incidents will be according to the implemented Emergency Support Functions of the Ohio Emergency Operations Plan, the Emergency Operations Plans of impacted jurisdictions, and according to the federal government’s National Response Framework.

b. Assignments of Responsibility for agencies that are partners to the State of Ohio Emergency Operations Plan will be according to activated Emergency Support Functions.

c. The IND Plan addresses agency-level actions that are unique to an IND incident response. All other agency responses will be according to those that are defined in other Ohio EOP elements.

P. Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

1. The actions that are taken for intelligence and information sharing and dissemination reflect many tasks that are routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.

2. The primary emphasis of fusion center activities is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks. The STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit also supports ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.

Q. Critical Infrastructure Protection

1. Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including those caused by any terrorism-related, accidental, or natural catastrophic event that could disrupt or destroy Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) in one or more sectors. Protective measures may be implemented based on the potential statewide impact if an infrastructure asset is damaged or destroyed, as a result of a terrorist attack, manmade or natural disaster or structural failure.

2. Under the CIP process as defined in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), protection of CI/KR requires an initial determination of whether the asset/system in question and the risks being posed are “critical.” Therefore, protection activities are conducted on a case-by-case basis.

3. For incidents that are addressed under CIP:

a. Resource needs at the state and local level will be determined through the development of a model that takes into account the presence and density of CI/KR assets in various geographic areas.
b. State and local law enforcement resources will be available to support CI/KR protection efforts, as required.

c. Critical infrastructure information will be able to be shared between Federal, State and local authorities and the private sector in a protected and secure way.

R. Chemical events that include WMD are addressed in: Ref: Appendix B, Tool Kit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents, July, 2002.

S. Biological events that include WMD are addressed in ESF-11, Tab A (Animal Disease Incident Plan), and ESF-8 Tab C (Human Infectious Disease Incident Plan).

T. Cyber events include actions involving or affecting information technology, data processing and storage. The newly-developed ESF-2 Tab B (Cyber Incident Response Plan) addresses Ohio’s response to cyber incidents.

U. Attacks on public and private utilities infrastructure, include attacks on public water supply systems, sewage plants, electric grids, oil and gas, and petroleum/hydrocarbon pipelines.

V. Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense

1. Food and agriculture safety and defense applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including accidental or deliberate human or animal disease outbreaks, nuclear events, and chemical events with potential for contamination of the food supply.

2. The identification of an intentional contamination incident involving a food product in Ohio will have national implications. Because of the movement of food products around the United States and within Ohio, it is possible that multiple food facilities in additional states may have been affected.

3. If terrorists were to introduce a chemical or biological agent into a food product at multiple sites simultaneously within Ohio or around the country, the requirements for resources will increase proportionately and may exist in many states or parts of Ohio simultaneously. The requirements for tactical (incident command) resources will increase proportionately with the amount of product/products contaminated.

4. It is likely that resources will be shared within Ohio and between states, and entities providing resources will have to balance the sharing of resources of their resources with their need to protect public and animal health within their own jurisdiction. The amount of tactical resource requirements will vary depending on the concentration of food facilities within a jurisdiction.

5. The time needed to resolve an incident will vary depending on number of site introductions and the number of different food items that have been contaminated.
6. The FDA and the USDA are the two primary agencies that regulate the nation’s food supply.

7. For incidents that are addressed under this section:
   
   a. All response personnel in key positions will be able to respond to their respective response positions after a contaminant has been introduced.
   
   b. Sector partners are effectively connected to an information sharing and analysis or fusion system concept where preventative and protective measure information is proactively being shared.
   
   c. Lack of infrastructure – electricity, phones, transportation, etc., will affect the ability to effectively communicate and will significantly affect the ability to plan appropriately or to respond to an incident.
   
   d. If roads are non-passable due to a natural disaster, this may affect the ability to get to impacted areas.
   
   e. Multi-Agency Coordination will be adequately addressed at State and local levels, and agencies will coordinate their responses as expected.
   
   f. The following information will be needed to effectively detect/respond to/recover from a food- or agriculture-related incident:
      
      i. Quantity of product(s) affected
      ii. Distribution of product(s)
      iii. Product type or types contaminated
      iv. Ability to determine the food item associated with illness or to rule out certain food items
      v. Ability to trace back product(s)
      vi. Ability to trace forward product(s)
      vii. Ability to effectively recall all affected product(s)
      viii. Appropriate disposal of recalled product(s)
      ix. Appropriate decontamination of food facility or other locations where food was available for purchase
      x. Risk communication to consumers about appropriate food disposal instructions
      xi. Communication with national and/or international partners

8. The total time for recovery for food and agriculture safety and defense response-related incidents could last several months, depending on the complexity, severity and breadth of the incident.
Preparedness for possible terrorist attacks must also consider that a variety of methods and devices may be employed. These range from sophisticated chemical, biological and radiological devices, to “home-made”, materials obtainable in hardware and farm supply stores. Delivery of these items may entail the use of U.S. Postal Service, aircraft, watercraft, motor vehicles, or hand delivery to an intended target.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

A. A terrorist event may create a level of disaster requiring federal assistance and the activation of the federal Emergency Response Plan.

B. Federal Action

1. As needed, the FBI will be represented in the State EOC for liaison and to coordinate response needs. The FBI will not initiate on-site response actions without coordinating with local authorities in their initial response, rescue and recovery efforts.

2. The USEPA will be responsible for the decontamination of facilities that have been affected by WMD incidents.

3. Public Information Support

   a. As needed, response agencies will furnish the public with applicable information.

   b. A Joint Information Center(s) (JIC) will be established to address public information issues.

   c. Ohio Homeland Security, Ohio State Highway Patrol, and Ohio Department of Health Public Information Officers will assume lead agency responsibilities for information liaison.

C. State-Level Action

1. The STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit is the State of Ohio’s Fusion Center, and is an information sharing entity that supports local, state, and federal agencies as they investigate terrorism and other related criminal activity. The STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit fuses information that includes suspicious activity from the public and private sectors begins the intelligence cycle and creates actionable intelligence products that give us the ability to detect and prevent terrorism.

D. Local- Level Action

1. Local and regional first responders will have the responsibility to be the first onsite to respond to and address the impacts of a terrorism-related incident. Employing the
correct personal protective equipment, they will continue their response until their capabilities have been exceeded.

2. Local emergency management officials, in consultation with local and regional first responders and local government officials, will request additional response resources from the State through their county emergency operations centers.

3. WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including those caused by explosive devices, hazardous materials tank explosions, biological and chemical releases, and nuclear and radiological dispersals.
   
a. If decontamination is ongoing during the early stages of a catastrophic incident, persons undergoing decontamination will have logistical, medical, and mental health needs that will need to be addressed quickly.

b. Decontamination will be prioritized in order of: life safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation.

c. Secondary contamination will be a major concern:
   
i. Hospital emergency rooms may close if patients are admitted without proper decontamination.

   ii. Control of runoff of fluids used in decontamination, and the handling of contaminated clothing and personal effects.

   iii. Secondary contamination of first responders, even those wearing personal protective equipment, can occur during the removal of patients from a hazardous area, during the performance of basic life support functions, or when initial responders are unaware that a hazardous material is involved.

d. Water-based oil release may extend beyond the 4-day limit. Assets will be on scene, but containment operations may not be able to begin immediately on arrival.

e. State-level resources will respond to these events within 12–24 hours. Federal resources will respond to these events within 24 hours. The United States has approximately 64 nuclear stations supported by the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP). No less than 30 REPP response teams should be able to respond to an “improvised nuclear device” scenario within 24 hours.

f. A significant number of individuals who are either exposed to a plume cloud or contaminant agent, or who fear that they might have been exposed, will flee the scene before first responders arrive. It may prove difficult to determine which of
those individuals require decontamination, and to ensure such individuals present themselves for decontamination.

g. Large-gathering situations (e.g., National Security Special Events, sporting events, conventions) will create higher localized population densities.

h. Biological agents will typically have delayed symptoms. As such, there will rarely be an on-site incident requiring response when a biological agent is released.

j. Health care facilities will be the most likely locations for treating patients affected by a human biological incident.

j. Psychological effects of being exposed to a terrorism incident may include short and long-term consequences.

E. Planning for response to bioterrorism incidents (e.g., anthrax, botulism, smallpox), is an ongoing activity within Ohio. Epidemiological surveillance and investigation will be applied in bioterrorism incident response. In biological event response, it will be assumed that:

1. Clinical presentation and laboratory confirmation will depend on the biological agent used in the terrorism incident.

2. Cases may continue to present despite public health intervention, depending on the biological agent used and the method in which it was distributed. (Factors that may play a role: incubation period, person-to-person transmission, products still in circulation due to failure to dispose of the contaminated product or additional contaminated products identified as a result of the investigation).

3. There will be an unprecedented level of public concern, anxiety, and fear as a result of these incidents.

4. There may be a concurrent law enforcement investigation at more than one jurisdictional level.

5. Staffing in response to these incidents may include Federal or State employees working at the local level.

6. Food contamination scenarios will involve a national response that involves local, State and Federal resources.

7. Non-naturally occurring biological events (i.e., bioterrorism incidents) may not be detected immediately after the exposure occurred or until large numbers of individuals are affected, particularly when the agent has a long incubation period.
8. Animal disease incidents may involve a national response that involves local, State and Federal resources.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Initiating Events

1. Situation One: A major act of terrorism has occurred outside Ohio and its neighboring states and has the potential to affect or involve the state.

   a. Upon the receipt of federal, or other secure, credible source, advisories or notifications regarding such events, STACC-OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit personnel will analyze information to gain situational awareness through classified and other information sources, and will brief the State Homeland Security Advisor.

   b. If the incident necessitates activation of the State EOC, the Ohio EMA Watch Office will:

      i. Notify state agencies with relationships to local first response organizations. These may include, but are not limited to, the OSHP, OHS, ODH, ODA, EPA, EMS, or others as determined by the Executive Director of Ohio EMA.

      ii. Activate the State EOC to Assessment and Monitoring or Partial Activation to:

          a) Assess the potential effect of a similar event upon the state of Ohio.

          b) Determine EMAC-related assistance actions.

          c) Inform and/or share information with key state and local government officials regarding the situation. Compile information regarding state and local preparedness status or needs.

          d) Conduct briefings.

          e) Issue alerts, notifications, and advisories consistent with federal levels or formats.

2. Situation Two: A major act of terrorism has occurred, or is underway, in a neighboring state which, although outside Ohio, has the potential to threaten, or affect the state. In addition to the actions cited in “Situation One”, above,

   a. The STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit will communicate with the appropriate fusion centers within the national fusion center network and with
Ohio’s regional fusion centers and relay appropriate information to the State EOC.

b. The State EOC will be activated to enable representatives from key state agencies to coordinate information with lead federal and local agencies or supporting state agencies as dictated by the situation. At a minimum, the team should consist of:

i. Ohio Homeland Security

ii. Ohio State Highway Patrol.

iii. Adjutant General’s Department.

iv. Ohio Department of Natural Resources.

v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.

vi. Ohio Department of Health.

vii. Others (ODA, PUCO, DAS, or state/private facilities and associations) as required for technical support.

viii. In addition to those primary functions and duties cited in “Situation One”, the state will:

a) Effect coordination with the FBI and/or other federal agencies and offices for technical support and advisory assistance as dictated by the situation.

b) Initiate coordination actions with local governments (via EOCs) in Ohio jurisdictions closest to an out-of-state affected area or areas.

c) Prepare appropriate action steps for potentially affected areas based on assessments of health and environmental needs for those areas (including epidemiological investigations).

d) Provide laboratory support when the FERN or NAHLN systems are activated.

3. Situation Three: A major act of terrorism has occurred in Ohio. In addition to the actions cited in “Situations One and Two”, above, the state of Ohio will:

a. Fully activate the State EOC.

b. Operate the Statewide Terrorism Analysis & Crime Center (STACC) in an extended capacity, as the situation dictates.
c. Initiate assistance or submit support requests in accordance with EMAC or IMAC considerations [See ESF-7 (Resource Support and Logistics) for further information].

d. Working in accordance with NIMS concepts, Lead Agencies will:

   i. Employ EOC/Joint Dispatch Facility assets to provide administrative, warning, and communications support for participating agencies.
   ii. Coordinate with the lead federal agency and involved local entities to determine needs or resolve issues with regards to:

      - Additional threat assessments or event verification functions to include intelligence and information sharing actions applicable to the situation and follow-on support efforts (including modifications of response protocols, by agency, as necessary).
      - Inter-agency support actions relating to traffic control, site/perimeter security, crime scene investigations, victim ID, or others as determined by the situation.
      - Coordination with federal agencies in designating a Joint Operations Center location and determine required liaison staffing for the JOC as necessary and in consideration of the setting (urban, rural, etc.).
      - Determine the need for and extent of public protective actions to include site and perimeter control, evacuations, sheltering, congregate care, prophylaxis, decontamination, or other measures (Ref: Ohio EOP – ESF-6, Mass Care).
      - Support mass care facilities as needed.
      - Develop, or confirm, by agency, rules of engagement/response, as required by the situation.

   e. Prior to the initiation of field support actions (including activities in privately owned facilities) by state-level support agencies, a declaration of a “State of Emergency” or similar enabling action will be made by the governor.

   f. In all events, an evaluation of the situation will be made with regards to a possible relocation to, and operation of, an alternate EOC to meet the contingencies of the situation and to provide 24-hour continuity for support functions.

      i. Emphasis will upon communications, accommodations, staffing space, and logistical support features.

B. State-Level Operations

   1. The authority for consequence management rests with the state assisted by federal agencies as necessary. It entails multiple agency participation, with the provision of technical advice and/or logistical support for both supporting and supported entities, information and educational continuity, combined asset management programs, and
an extended partnership approach to both federal and state supporting efforts for affected areas.

2. The organization for consequence management in the State EOC will be based upon the structure outlined in the State of Ohio EOP.

3. The organization is based upon groupings of assigned primary functions. The specifics of an event may cause various agencies representing critical services, to shift assignments from technical support to primary or lead agency positions (eg, the Department of Agriculture may assume the lead role in an agricultural terror event).

4. The State Coordinating Officer, pre-identified by the Governor, will work with federal offices (FEMA or others as designated) to affect a combined state-federal management effort.

5. Participating agency representatives may need to provide support in locations other than the State EOC (e.g., DFOs, Recovery Centers or other sites).

6. Military Support

   a. The OHNG National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) provides security forces in a non-CBRNE environment in support of local law enforcement (LE).

   b. The OHNG 52nd WMD-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST), will provide technical assistance and advice in support of WMD incidents.

   c. The OHNG FEMA Region V Homeland Response Force (HRF) provides CBRNE response in the form of command and control, search and extraction, decontamination, and limited medical triage/treatment, communications and fatality search and recovery assets.

   d. Guard Emergency Liaison Officers (GELOs) from the OHNG are provided as required and available to support Incident Command Posts (ICP), Unified Commands (UC), Area Commands (AC), joint field offices, and the State EOC.

7. Consequence management will be implemented as follows:

   a. For continuing Credible Threat Advisories/Conditions: Based upon credible threat information, state and federal agencies will advise local governmental agencies regarding additional confirmed threats of terrorism.

      i. The STACC, serving as the State’s primary fusion center, will continue to monitor the situation for emerging threats and report changes to the State Homeland Security Advisor and the State EOC.
b. Incident/event-related Consequence Management: If a terrorist event occurs, the Governor may declare a state of emergency and applicable Consequence Management actions will be implemented:

i. Activation of the State EOC as per the State of Ohio EOP and State EOC SOPs.

ii. Requesting federal assistance in accordance with Federal Response Plan procedures.

iii. An OHS representative will be assigned to the JOC, if established, to monitor events and relay decisions affecting Consequence Management actions to the State EOC. Other state agencies can be dispatched to assist in this function. These agencies could include Ohio EMA, ODH, EPA, ODNR, OSHP, or ODA as required.

iv. State agencies will coordinate the provision of assistance to affected areas to include basic protective action support (mass care, immunization, medical treatment, evacuations, relocations, sheltering, hazardous materials response, agriculture). For more information, reference the Ohio EOP’s ESF-6 (Mass Care); ESF-7 (Resource Support and Logistics); ESF-10 (Oil, Gas and Hazardous Materials); ESF-11 (Agriculture); ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical Services).

v. Upon request, the 52nd WMD-CST will mobilize, deploy to the affected area and establish operations in conjunction with the Incident Commander.

c. The 52nd WMD-CST will coordinate with the established incident command to assist in assessments, hazard identification and coordination of follow-on forces as necessary.

8. Public Information Support: OSHP and the OHS PIOs will serve in a lead capacity (with Ohio EMA) for Ohio. Public information specialists from other lead agencies will serve in this capacity when required by the situation.

a. Duties include:

i. The determination of state agency information assistance to include development and response/dissemination methodology and mediums.

ii. Defining specific sharing of public information or educational duties.

iii. The coordination of specific event-related public information actions by lead and support agencies as required.
iv. Monitoring/analysis of media coverage of events and activities as they relate to the situation.

9. Demobilization

a. In accordance with NIMS concepts, OSHP, OHS and Ohio EMA will coordinate with lead federal and other state agencies for an appropriate date/time for state Consequence Management disengagement.

b. Following disengagement, designated state and local organizations may continue recovery (to include long term hazard monitoring, environmental/personnel decontamination and site restoration) efforts.

c. Post event actions will include debriefings, general agency performance reviews and after-action documentation.

C. Federal-Level Operations

1. For all suspected WMD incidents in which the FBI is involved, the WMD Coordinator (or his/her representative) will initiate a Threat Creditability Evaluation (TCE) with the FBI HQ WMD Directorate.

2. An assessment of the threat, a course of additional response, crime scene operations, and investigation will be determined and executed.

V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Organization

1. Ohio Homeland Security is the Coordinating Agency for the Terrorism Incident Response Annex, and will be responsible for working with this ESF’s Support Agencies to ensure that there is a seamless integration of, and transition between preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The Coordinating Agency’s primary responsibility will be to focus on engaging Support Agencies in pre-incident planning and coordination opportunities.

2. Ohio Homeland Security and the Ohio State Highway Patrol are the Primary Agencies for the Terrorism Incident Response Annex, and will take the lead in coordinating and reporting on the Annex’s related missions and operations.

3. The Annex’s support agencies will be activated through the State EOC for assessment, response, and recovery operations based on the needs of the emergency. Primary and Support Agencies will coordinate with one another to ensure the most effective use of personnel and equipment, to avoid redundant activities, and to cooperate on emergency response missions.
4. All agency-based resources will be provided as they are needed, as they are available, and as agencies are able to provide them.

5. The activation of state-level response agencies through the State EOC will be dependent on an incident’s type and magnitude. Minor incidents might be adequately addressed locally, while larger incidents might necessitate the activation of the State EOC’s assessment, response and recovery capabilities and the creation and completion of missions for and by State-level agencies through the State EOC.

6. When possible, State agencies will carry out their assignments of responsibility as indicated in other Ohio EOP elements to address impacts that are the result of a terrorism-related incident.

7. Support agencies to this plan will provide support, personnel, advice, and equipment to local and state agencies and responders.

8. Additional state-level agencies that are not listed in this plan may provide additional support based on incident needs.

B. All Support Agencies

As it is determined to be appropriate to the focus, resources and capabilities of their agencies, and based on the type and level of incident, all Support Agencies to this Plan and other agencies as needed at the time will work jointly or individually to address the following Assignments of Responsibilities:

1. Information Assessment, Monitoring, Collection and Reporting

   a. Collect, or assist in the collection and cataloguing of information that could be used to identify terrorist operations from the STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit, law enforcement, public health, agriculture, public works, transportation, firefighting, emergency medical entities and the private sector. When requested, partner agencies will maintain a presence at the STACC - OHS Terrorism Analysis Unit to support this responsibility.

   b. Assist in the identification of suspicious circumstances or indicators and warnings associated with planning, support, and operations, related to potential criminal and/or terrorist-related activities.

   c. Gather, catalogue, and preserve evidence for prosecutorial purposes and attribution and maintain chain of custody of evidentiary materials.

   d. Share investigation-related information across jurisdictions and among law enforcement and other agencies.
e. Provide appropriate situational information to the State EOC and the Joint Information Center (JIC).

2. Critical Infrastructure Protection

a. When requested, maintain a presence at the Strategic Analysis & Information Center (SAIC)-Infrastructure Protection Unit/Cybersecurity Unit with access to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office Infrastructure Protection Gateway system (IP Gateway), to provide a comprehensive and consistent integrated inventory of a targeted asset and an assessment of assets located within a specified radius of the damaged or destroyed affected assets to be reported to the STACC and to the State EOC.

b. Implement detection measures such as inspection surveillance, employee monitoring, and security counterintelligence.

c. Conduct consequence analyses to determine which assets, systems, networks, and functions are high consequence and therefore require risk assessment.

d. Employ vulnerability, risk and threat assessments/profiles on high-consequence assets, systems, networks, and functions for the assessment of critical infrastructure threats.

e. Prioritize high-risk CI/KR for consideration of protective measures.

f. Implement protective programs and plans to reduce the general level of risk for the highest risk CI/KR and to respond to and recover from specific threat-initiated actions.

g. Implement programs to defend critical cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions.

C. Agency-Specific Assignments of Responsibility

1. Ohio Department of Public Safety, Division of Ohio Homeland Security, Statewide Terrorism Analysis & Crime Center (STACC)

a. Coordinate information and intelligence between state, local and federal partners

b. Expeditiously identify, process, analyze, evaluate and disseminate (as appropriate) threat information.

c. Monitor, process, organize, analyze, evaluate, document, and disseminate appropriate incident related information, intelligence and data in a manner that allows it to be easily visualized and understood.
d. Support law enforcement information needs.

2. Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA)

   a. Identify and report on contagious or infectious diseases in animals that are reportable to the ODA and must be reported when a case is suspected.

   b. Assist in the coordination of food and agricultural safety response operations and support, and food and agriculture investigation activities.

   c. Direct agricultural processes for surveillance and testing and isolation or quarantine in response to threats to agricultural assets and the food supply.

   d. Establish and maintain food and agricultural safety response communication systems and coordinate the provision of timely and accurate emergency public information through the Joint Information System (JIS).

   e. In coordination with DAS, through the State EOC, support and/or provide human and veterinary medical guidance, laboratories, and pharmaceuticals and supplies in response to disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

   f. Coordinate with the network of veterinary, agricultural, and public health laboratories and other diagnostic facilities for response to bioterrorism incidents.

   g. Provide leadership in public health investigations to determine, in collaboration with law enforcement, human and animal disease source(s)

   h. Report instances of disease and/or contamination that raise the index of suspicion of terrorist or criminal involvement to the FBI.

   i. As able, and as needed, dispatch public health or agriculture personnel to location(s) of suspected disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

   j. Assist in coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the safety and security of food products in retail food establishments, food service operations and institutions.

   k. Provide support for, and/or monitor and/or conduct inspections for the safety and security of food, food facilities, and/or the agricultural infrastructure in impacted areas.

   l. Conduct epidemiological investigations as warranted by surveillance reports, and coordinate Federal, State, and local veterinary assistance assets/services.
m. Provide assistance in the search for possible food and agriculture contamination, plant disease or animal disease cases, and use the results from sample analyses to determine the breadth of disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

n. Support and/or conduct laboratory testing, field investigation and product tracing to determine the source, destination, and disposition of adulterated, contaminated or diseased products, plants, or animals.

o. Support and/or provide appropriate information to the public regarding the disposal of potentially contaminated food and/or agricultural products.

p. Assist in the determination of the need for and provide guidance for the embargo, detention, stoppage, condemnation, retention and seizure of food, plants and animals.

q. Assist in the determination of the need for, and provide guidance for the control of identified food products through product recall, administrative detention, and plant closures at establishments that are suspected of being contaminated.

r. Assist in the determination of the need for, and provide guidance for the disposal of contaminated or diseased food, plants or animals.

s. Use standardized protocols to detect emerging infectious agents or possible bioterrorism agents in human clinical specimens, food, animal or environmental samples.

3. Ohio Department of Health (ODH)

a. Assist in the coordination of mass fatality operations, in accordance with the Acute and Non-Acute Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plans, respectively.

b. Work in close partnership with local public health epidemiology, animal health and environmental health entities, and poison control to provide timely data to assure implementation of effective prevention, detection, and control measures, including treatment.

c. Monitor BioWatch analyses.

d. Perform or obtain laboratory testing on clinical specimens or environmental samples as required by the bioterrorism incident, e.g. white powder specimens.

e. Provide human and veterinary medical guidance, and support access to laboratories, pharmaceuticals and supplies.

f. Coordinate with the response network of public health laboratories and other diagnostic facilities for bioterrorism incidents.
g. Provide leadership in public health investigations to determine human and animal disease source(s), in collaboration with law enforcement.

h. Report instances of disease and/or contamination that raise the index of suspicion of terrorist or criminal involvement to the FBI.

i. As able and as needed, dispatch public health personnel to location(s) of suspected disease outbreaks and/or radiological/chemical contamination.

j. Assist in the coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the safety and security of food products in retail food establishments, food service operations and institutions.

k. Provide support for, and/or monitor and/or conduct inspections for the safety and security of food and food facilities in impacted areas.

l. Provide assistance in the search for possible food and agriculture contamination and animal disease cases, and use the results from sample analyses to determine the breadth of disease outbreaks and/or contamination.

m. Support and/or conduct laboratory testing, field investigation and product tracing to determine the source, destination, and disposition of adulterated, contaminated products or diseased animals.

n. Support and/or provide appropriate information to the public regarding the disposal of potentially radiologically contaminated food and/or agricultural products.

o. Assist in the determination of the need for and provide guidance for the embargo, detention, stoppage, condemnation, retention and seizure of food, plants and animals due to radiologic contamination.

p. Assist in the determination of the need for and provide guidance for the control of identified food products at food service operations and retail food establishments that are suspected of being contaminated through product recall, administrative detention, or other means.

q. Provide technical assistance regarding impacted retail products that are intended for consumption and/or inhalation that may be radiologically contaminated.

4. Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP)

a. Through STACC-based Intelligence Analyst, support criminal investigations associated with terrorism-related incidents.

b. As needed, provide and support security measures at incident sites.
5. Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT)
   a. Support the establishment and maintenance of transport systems and mechanisms to assist in the timely delivery and receipt of samples or specimens for laboratory testing.

6. Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR)
   a. Coordinate with local law enforcement for maritime and port security on Lake Erie and the Ohio River.
   b. Coordinate with the United States Coast Guard for maritime and port security on Lake Erie and the Ohio River
   c. Support ESF-13 with law enforcement-related missions and transporting evidence when needed.
   d. Provide information related to the matter to the STACC and ESF-13 lead.

7. Ohio Adjutant General’s Department – Ohio National Guard (OHNG)
   a. As needed, provide and support security measures at incident sites.
   b. As needed, provide security and or transportation resources for the delivery and receipt of samples or specimens for laboratory testing.