STATE OF OHIO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

TERRORISM INCIDENT ANNEX

Primary Agencies: Ohio Homeland Security (OHS)
Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP)

Support Agencies: Ohio Adjutant General's Department – Ohio National Guard (ONG)
Office of the Attorney General (AG)
Ohio Department of Administrative Services (DAS)
Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA)
Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of the State Fire Marshal (SFM)
Ohio Emergency Management Agency (OEMA)
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA)
Ohio Department of Health (ODH)
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR)
Ohio Emergency Medical Services (OEMS)
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO)
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)
Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

1. The purpose of this Plan is to:

   a. Present an overview of the terrorism-related hazards that potentially face the State of Ohio

   b. Describe State-level agency capabilities and expertise that exist to address those hazards during response operations

   c. Provide an outline of the concept of operations that will be employed in response to terrorism incidents

   d. Provide an outline of the assignment of responsibilities of State Agencies (listed above) that are partner to this Plan that will be applied to the response to terrorism-related incidents that occur within the State.

B. Scope

1. This Plan applies to all acts, or threats of terrorism that could have serious effects upon the state and its population. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "…the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civil population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives". Chapter 2909.21 of the Ohio Revised Code (ORC) further defines "Acts of Terrorism" applicable to the state of Ohio.

2. A terrorism-related incident that occurs in Ohio will require immediate local-, State- and federal-level actions to be initiated. Response to any terrorism-related incident will follow the operational priorities of

   a. Protection of life, safety and stabilization of incident environment(s)

   b. Investigation of the incident

   c. Restoration of property and the built environment

3. Response to terrorism-related incidents will be centered on and will be geared toward enabling responding organizations to recognize the situation, rapidly and effectively exchange data, initiate and direct responses, and enable other offices to determine and prepare their roles in subsequent recovery-related actions.

4. Command and control over terrorism-related incidents will remain with the lowest-possible jurisdictional level.

5. Presidential Decision Directive 39, the U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 1995, designates the FBI as the lead agency for federal domestic terrorism response actions, with assistance furnished by state and local governments as required. If an event is determined to be an act of terrorism, federal resources will be brought to bear in support of operations in the state of Ohio. These may include specialists from Domestic Emergency Support Team, HAZMAT, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or other fields as required. Their availability will be coordinated by the FBI and the State Emergency Operations Center (State EOC).

6. The Ohio Department of Public Safety, Division of Ohio Homeland Security (OHS) is the lead agency for collecting, analyzing, maintaining, and disseminating information and intelligence to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, and private organizations in detecting, deterring, preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from threatened or actual terrorist events.

   The information that is gathered in this effort is not a public record (ORC §149.43 Am. Sub. S. B. No. 9.47.) ORC §5502.03(B) further states that OHS will develop and coordinate policies, protocols, and strategies that may be used to prevent, detect,

prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist acts or threats; and that OHS will coordinate efforts of state and local governments and private organizations to enhance the security and protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in this state.

7. Any person, facility, area, complex or installation within the State of Ohio could be a potential target of terrorism. The State of Ohio has developed a list of Critical Facilities within the state. This list is maintained as a "security document" in accordance with Ch. 149.433 (ORC). Increased security measures with regard to these facilities will be taken automatically in conjunction with changes to various terrorism threat levels. These measures will be addressed in specific action plans which will also be developed and maintained as "Secure Documents". Changes or additions to such security measures will be recommended by the State Homeland Security Advisor to the governor based on current intelligence from the State Fusion Center and its partners.

II. SITUATION

A. Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the State of Ohio, its citizens and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources.

B. Prevention actions that are undertaken are important regardless of the type of threat, adversary capability, or time or location of an incident. These actions may be those that are routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they investigate traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.

C. Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack.

D. The consequences (or cascading effects) of terrorism could outlast or surpass an initiating event. Effects may include long-term health and medical problems, extended economic issues, or political and social concerns.

E. Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary action categories: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination.

F. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security will communicate critical information about imminent or elevated terrorist threats by issuing a National Threat Advisory System alert. These alerts provide timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector. These alerts will include a clear statement that there is an *imminent* threat or an *elevated* threat**.** An

imminent threat warns of a credible, specific, and impending terrorist threat against the United States. An elevated threat warns of a credible terrorist threat against the United States. Using available information, the alerts will provide a concise summary of the potential threat, information about actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that individuals, communities, businesses and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate or respond to the threat.

G. Credible threats are those based upon accrued intelligence and evidence that indicate an act of terrorism is imminent or has occurred. Credible threat information may further indicate the use or presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

H. Primary Statewide Fusion Center – Ohio Homeland Security's Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) coordinates the collection, analysis, maintenance, and dissemination of information and intelligence to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, and private organizations in detecting, deterring, preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from threatened or actual terrorist events. The SAIC also coordinates efforts of state and local governments and private organizations to enhance the security and protection of critical infrastructure and key assets in Ohio.

I. Laboratory Testing **–** Plans to augment the capacity of human, animal, plant and food health laboratories include having access to electronic information systems that send and receive test results in compliance with the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) Functional Area for Connecting Laboratory, Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) Systems.

J. Types of Chemical Agents

   a. Biotoxins—poisons that come from plants or animals;

   b. Blister agents/vesicants—chemicals that severely blister the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin on contact

   c. Blood agents—poisons that affect the body by being absorbed into the blood;

   d. Caustics (acids)—chemicals that burn or corrode people's skin, eyes, and mucus membranes (lining of the nose, mouth, throat, and lungs) on contact;

   e. Choking/lung/pulmonary agents—chemicals that cause severe irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract (lining of the nose and throat, lungs);

   f. Incapacitating agents—drugs that make people unable to think clearly or that cause an altered state of consciousness (possibly unconsciousness);

   g. Long-acting anticoagulants—poisons that prevent blood from clotting properly, which can lead to uncontrolled bleeding;

   h. Metals—agents that consist of metallic poisons; Nerve agents—highly poisonous chemicals that work by preventing the nervous system from working properly;

i. Organic solvents—agents that damage the tissues of living things by dissolving fats and oils; Riot control agents/tear gas—highly irritating agents normally used by law enforcement for crowd control or by individuals for protection (for example, mace);

j. Toxic alcohols—poisonous alcohols that can damage the heart, kidneys, and nervous system; and Vomiting agents—chemicals that cause nausea and vomiting.

K. In the case of the accidental or intentional release of a chemical agent, in addition to affected individuals, there will be many worried well. It can be anticipated that up to 25% of the worried well population may also require testing. It will be difficult to determine the proportion of the downwind population that will be classified as the worried-well, but it is a good assumption that a large proportion of the worried-well will request testing.

L. Current laboratory resources for chemical testing include the following laboratories California – Richmond ; Florida – Jacksonville; Michigan – Lansing; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Mexico; New York; South Carolina; Virginia; Wisconsin; in addition to the CDC- Atlanta GA.

M. "Surge Capacity States" are also capable of performing various methods support of the laboratories listed. In a surge mode, states without chemical testing capabilities, such as Ohio, will be informed by the CDC or the laboratory to send specimens.

N. Laboratory Testing for Biological Agents

1. Factors that could affect the number of specimens/samples tested could include time involved to set up the assay, machine capacity, personnel shift durations, the condition that specimens/samples arrived in, physical working space, and individual pace of laboratorians.

2. Laboratory surge capacity needs will be addressed by the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), FERN, and NAHLN systems. There may be concurrent law enforcement-based investigations within multiple jurisdictions and at jurisdictional layers.

O. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE)

1. Applicable situations for CBRNE events include explosive devices, hazardous materials tank explosions, biological and toxic releases, nuclear devices, and radiological dispersals.

2. CBRNE detection addresses biological agents, and may employ the testing of medical or plant samples via blood and medical tests. Medical and syndromic surveillance detection of biological agents is addressed in Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation, as well as in Food and Agriculture Safety (see II.C and II.E, above). To be effective, close integration of this set of activities must occur within CBRNE Detection actions.

3. Large-Scale CBRNE Events

    a. The main incident prevention strategy will be to use detection technologies and screening processes to interdict CBRNE materials before they are used. The alternative strategy will be to rely on existing detection technology, law enforcement investigations and alternate technologies to determine the presence of threat devices.

    b. A national capability to address large CBRNE events will be developed through the design and deployment of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and other similar programs.

    c. The State and its local jurisdictions will seek to develop and implement detection capabilities through use of DHS grants and guidance.

    d. Develop equipment, training and communications standards to facilitate and validate the deployment and use of detection technologies.

4. CBRNE Assignments of Responsibility for Detection and Reporting

    a. The assignments of responsibility for CBRNE detection and reporting in response to a terrorism incident are addressed in ESF-10, Hazardous Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction. These responsibilities may include:

        i. Conduct CBRNE detection and confirmation screening of manufacturing operations that are intended for illegal manufacture and/or use.

        ii. Conduct CBRNE detection operations at key transportation points and detect CBRNE material on people or items entering/boarding events, aircraft, mass transit, or other high impact targets.

        iii. Inspect and monitor cargo at key interdiction points for potential CBRNE material.

        iv. Provide CBRNE samples to relevant entities (public health or animal health laboratories, law enforcement, forensic laboratories, etc.) for additional assessments, as necessary.

        v. Coordinate and transmit CBRNE material threat and discovery information with intelligence, public safety, public health and other appropriate agencies.

K. Explosive Device Response Operations

1. Coverage by Bomb Squad Teams

   a. Coverage of high-density population and critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) locations by Type I-level bomb squad teams is critical to the adequate protection of these assets and resources.

   b. For locations that are not covered by a Type I-level team, Type II- and III-level teams may be combined to create a Type I-level team or assets may be accessed via other means. In some cases, this could result in a response delay.

   c. All situations will be assessed by the bomb technician on the scene as to time sensitive considerations. Safety issues will take precedence over time considerations.

   d. In a catastrophic level Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) situation where full remote capabilities are available, it is desired to have the technological potential for diagnostics and execution of the disruption tools within one hour from time of arrival on the scene.

2. Response to Large Vehicle Bombs

   a. Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIED) will require a response from a Type II team minimum, plus Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) training and equipment that meets standards set by NBSCAB

3. Response to Suicide Bombing(s)

   a. Effective response times to suicide bombers are directly related to threat identification and the communicative chain to dispatch.

   b. Response timelines to suicide bombers are dependent on the location of the event relative to the placement of the response resources.

   c. Response to suicide bombers will be more effective if a system is in place to ensure the timely receipt of intelligence or device information to assist those responding to the threat.

   d. Bomb Squad – A bomb response organization consists of at least one bomb response team (see the definition of a “bomb response team”), accredited by the FBI Hazardous Devices School to standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.

   e. Bomb Response Team – A sub-unit within a bomb squad, consisting of at least two certified bomb technicians and a full set of equipment meeting minimum

standards for bomb squad operations. Military EOD units are not currently resource typed within NIMS but are available to respond to incidents in the community either to assist the "accredited" bomb squad, or respond to the incident in an area without State/local bomb squad presence.

L. The assignments of responsibility for WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination in response to a terrorism incident are addressed in ESF-10, Hazardous Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction. ESF-10 addresses the following during hazardous materials/WMD incidents:

1. Providing resource support to local jurisdictions as requested.

2. Coordination of state-level and non-governmental organizations in support of local response.

3. Coordination with federal agencies through the National Response Framework (NRF), including the NRF ESF-10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP, 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300).

4. Providing protective action recommendations to local jurisdictions.

5. Assessment of the health effects of a hazardous material/WMD release.

6. Sampling of air, water, soil, and other materials to test for contamination.

7. Assistance in recovery and mitigation.

M. Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

1. The actions that are taken for intelligence and information sharing and dissemination reflect many tasks that are routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.

2. The primary emphasis of fusion center activities is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks. TheFusion Center also supports ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.

N. Critical Infrastructure Protection

1. Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including those caused by any terrorism-related, accidental, or natural catastrophic event that could disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) in one or more sectors. Protective measures may be implemented based on the potential statewide impact if an infrastructure asset is damaged or destroyed, as a result of a terrorist attack, manmade or natural disaster or structural failure.

2. Under the CIP process as defined in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), protection of CI/KR requires an initial determination of whether the asset/system in question and the risks being posed are "critical." Therefore, protection activities are conducted on a case-by-case basis.

3. For incidents that are addressed under CIP:

    a. Resource needs at the state and local level will be determined through the development of a model that takes into account the presence and density of CI/KR assets in various geographic areas.

    b. State and local law enforcement resources will be available to support CI/KR protection efforts, as required.

    c. Critical infrastructure information will be able to be shared between Federal, State and local authorities and the private sector in a protected and secure way.

O. Chemical events that include WMD are addressed in: Ref: Appendix B, Tool Kit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents, July, 2002 and State of Ohio Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan, 2001).

P. Biological events that include WMD are addressed in Ref: Appendix A, Tool Kit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents, July, 2002 and Threatened Human Biologic Incidents: Ohio Guidelines (ODH) 2002, Animal Disease Incident Plan 2008), Human Infectious Disease Incident Plan (2013).

Q. Cyber events include actions involving or affecting information technology, data processing and storage.

R. Attacks on public and private utilities infrastructure, include attacks on public water supply, sewage, petroleum/hydrocarbon pipelines.

S. Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense

1. Food and agriculture safety and defense applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including accidental or deliberate human or animal disease outbreaks, , nuclear and chemical events with potential for contamination of the food supply.

2. The identification of an intentional contamination incident involving a food product in Ohio will have national implications. Because of the movement of food products around the United States and within Ohio, it is possible that multiple food facilities in additional states may have been affected.

3. If terrorists were to introduce a chemical or biological agent into a food product at multiple sites simultaneously within the State or around the country, the requirements

for resources will increase proportionately and may exist in many States or parts of the Ohio simultaneously. The requirements for tactical (incident command) resources will increase proportionately with the amount of product/products contaminated.

4. It is likely that resources will be shared within the State and between states, and entities providing resources will have to balance the sharing of resources of their resources with their need to protect public and animal health within their own jurisdiction. The amount of tactical resource requirements will vary depending on the concentration of food facilities within a jurisdiction.

5. The time needed to resolve an incident will vary depending on number of site introductions and the number of different food items that have been contaminated.

6. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 80 percent of the nation's food supply – everything except meat, poultry, and egg products which are regulated by USDA.

7. For incidents that are addressed under this section:

    a. All response personnel in key positions will be able to respond to their respective response positions after a contaminant has been introduced.

    b. Sector partners are effectively connected to an information sharing and analysis or fusion system concept where preventative and protective measure information is proactively being shared.

    c. Lack of infrastructure – electricity, phones, transportation, etc., will affect the ability to effectively communicate and will significantly affect the ability to plan appropriately or to respond to an incident.

    d. If roads are non-passable due to a natural disaster, this may affect the ability to get to impacted areas.

    e. Multi-Agency Coordination will be adequately addressed at State and local levels, and agencies will coordinate their responses as expected.

    f. The following information will be needed to effectively detect/respond to/recover from an incident: Quantity of product affected, Distribution of product, Product type or types contaminated, Laboratory capability, Ability to determine the cause of illness, Ability to determine the food item associated with illness or to rule out certain food items, Ability to trace back product, Ability to trace forward product, Ability to effectively recall all affected product, Appropriate disposal of recalled product, Appropriate decontamination of food facility or other locations where food was available for purchase, Risk communication to consumers about appropriate food disposal instructions, and Communication with international partners.

8. The total time for recovery for food and agriculture safety and defense response-related incidents could last several months, depending on the complexity, severity and breadth of the incident.

T. Preparedness for possible terrorist attacks must also consider that a variety of methods and devices may be employed. These range from sophisticated chemical, biological and radiological devices, to "home-made", materials obtainable in hardware and farm supply stores. Delivery of these items may entail the use of U.S. Postal Service, aircraft, watercraft, motor vehicles, or hand delivery to an intended target.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

A. A terrorist event may create a level of disaster requiring federal assistance and the activation of the federal Emergency Response Plan.

B. Federal Action

1. As needed, the FBI will be represented in the state EOC for liaison and to coordinate response needs. The FBI will not initiate on-site response actions without coordinating with local authorities in their initial response, rescue and recovery efforts.

2. The USEPA will be responsible for the decontamination of facilities that have been affected by WMD incidents.

3. Public Information Support

a. As needed, response agencies will furnish the public with applicable information.

b. A Joint Information Center(s) (JIC) will be established to address public information issues.

c. Ohio Homeland Security, Ohio State Highway Patrol, and Ohio Department of Health Public Information Officers will assume lead agency responsibilities for information liaison.

C. State-Level Action

1. The Strategic Analysis Information Center (SAIC) will operate 24 hours per day, 7 days per week as necessary.

D. WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including those caused by explosive devices, hazardous materials tank explosions, biological and chemical releases, and nuclear and radiological dispersals.

1. If decontamination is ongoing during the early stages of a catastrophic incident, persons undergoing decontamination will have logistical, medical, and mental health needs that will need to be addressed quickly.

2. Decontamination will be prioritized in order of: life safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation.

3. Secondary contamination will be a major concern:

    a. Hospital emergency rooms may close if patients are admitted without proper decontamination.

    b. Control of runoff of fluids used in decontamination, and the handling of contaminated clothing and personal effects.

    c. Secondary contamination of first responders, even those wearing personal protective equipment, can occur during the removal of patients from a hazardous area, during the performance of basic life support functions, or when initial responders are unaware that a hazardous material is involved.

4. Efforts will be made to ensure that all fires are extinguished within a 4-day response phase.

5. Water-based oil release may extend beyond the 4-day limit. Assets will be on scene, but containment operations may not be able to begin immediately on arrival.

6. State-level resources will respond to these events within 12–24 hours. Federal resources will respond to these events within 24 hours. The United States has approximately 64 nuclear stations supported by the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP). No less than 30 REPP response teams should be able to respond to an "improvised nuclear device" scenario within 24 hours.

7. A significant number of individuals who are either exposed to a plume cloud or contaminant agent, or who fear that they might have been exposed, will flee the scene before first responders arrive. It may prove difficult to determine which of those individuals require decontamination, and to ensure such individuals present themselves for decontamination.

8. Large-gathering situations (e.g., National Security special events, sporting events, conventions) will create higher localized population densities.

9. Biological agents will typically have delayed symptoms. As such, there will rarely be an on-site incident requiring response when a biological agent is released.

10. Health care facilities will be the most likely locations for treating patients affected by a human biological incident.

11. Psychological effects of being exposed to a terrorism incident may include short and long-term consequences.

E. Planning for response to bioterrorism incidents (e.g., anthrax, botulism, smallpox), is an ongoing activity within Ohio. Epidemiological surveillance and investigation will be applied in bioterrorism incident response. In biological event response, it will be assumed that:

1. Clinical presentation and laboratory confirmation will depend on the biological agent used in the terrorism incident.

2. Cases may continue following public health intervention depending on the biological agent used and the method in which it was distributed. (Factors that may play a role: incubation period, person-to-person transmission, products still in circulation due to failure to dispose of the contaminated product or additional contaminated products identified as a result of the investigation). .

3. There will be an unprecedented level of public concern, anxiety, and fear as a result of these incidents.

4. There may be a concurrent law enforcement investigation at more than one jurisdictional level.

5. Staffing in response to these incidents may include Federal or State employees working at the local level.

6. Food contamination scenarios will involve a national response that involves local, State and Federal resources.

7. Non-naturally occurring biological events (i.e., bioterrorism incidents) may not be detected immediately after the exposure occurred or until large numbers of individuals are affected, particularly when the agent has a long incubation period.

8. Animal disease incidents may involve a national response that involves local, State and Federal resources.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Initiating Events

1. A major act of terrorism has occurred outside the state of Ohio and its neighboring states and has the potential to affect or involve the state.

   a. Upon the receipt of federal, or other secure, credible source, advisories or notifications regarding such events, SAIC personnel will analyze information to gain situational awareness through classified and other information sources, and will brief the State Homeland Security Advisor.

   b. If the incident necessitates activation of the EOC, Ohio EMA will, through the Ohio EOC:

      i. Notify state agencies with relationships to local first response organizations. These may include, but are not limited to, the OSHP, OHS, ODH, ODA, EPA, EMS, or others as determined by the Executive Director of Ohio EMA.

      ii. Partially activate the state EOC (assessment, executive rooms) to:

         a) Assess the potential effect of a similar event upon the state of Ohio.

         b) Determine EMAC-related assistance actions (or Ohio's needs).

         c) Inform (and/or share information with) key state and local government officials regarding the situation. Compile information regarding state and local preparedness status or needs.

         d) Conduct briefings.

         e) Issue alerts, notifications, and advisories consistent with federal levels or formats.

2. A major act of terrorism has occurred, or is underway, in a neighboring state which, although outside the state of Ohio, has the potential to threaten, or affect the state. In addition to the actions cited in "Situation 1", above,

   a. The SAIC will communicate with affected state's fusion center and relay appropriate information to the EOC.

   b. The state EOC will be activated to enable representatives from key state agencies to coordinate information with lead federal and local agencies or supporting state agencies as dictated by the situation. At a minimum, the team should consist of:

      i. Ohio Homeland Security

ii. Ohio State Highway Patrol.

iii. Adjutant General's Department.

iv. Ohio Department of Natural Resources.

v. Environmental Protection Agency.

vi. Department of Health.

vii. Others (ODA, PUCO, DAS, or state/private facilities and associations) as required for technical support.

viii. In addition to those primary functions and duties cited in "Situation l", the state will:

a) Effect coordination with the FBI and/or other federal agencies and offices for technical support and advisory assistance as dictated by the situation.

b) Initiate coordination actions with local governments (via EOCs) in Ohio jurisdictions closest to an out-of-state affected area or areas.

c) Prepare appropriate action steps for potentially affected areas based on assessments of health and environmental needs for those areas (including epidemiological investigations).

d) Provide laboratory support when the FERN or NAHLN systems are activated.

3. A major act of terrorism has occurred in the state of Ohio. In addition to the actions cited in "Situations 1 and 2", above, the state of Ohio will:

a. Fully activate the state EOC.

b. Operate the Strategic Analysis Information Center in an extended capacity, as the situation dictates.

b. Initiate assistance or submit support requests in accordance with EMAC or IMAC considerations (Ref: ESF 7, Resource Support, Ohio EOP).

c. Working in accordance with ICS/UCS concepts, Lead Agencies will:

i. Employ EOC/Joint Dispatch Facility assets to furnish administrative, warning, and communications support for participating agencies.

ii. Coordinate with the lead federal agency and involved local entities to determine needs or resolve issues with regard to:

- Additional threat assessments or event verification functions to include intelligence and information sharing actions applicable to the situation and follow-on support efforts (including modifications of response protocols, by agency, as necessary).
- Inter-agency support actions relating to traffic control, site/perimeter security, crime scene investigations, victim ID, or others as determined by the situation.
- Coordination with federal agencies in designating a Joint Operations Center location and determine required liaison staffing for the JOC as necessary and in consideration of the setting (urban, rural, etc.).
- Determine the need for and extent of public protective actions to include site and perimeter control, evacuations, sheltering, congregate care, prophylaxis, decontamination, or other measures (Ref: ESF-6, Mass Care, State of Ohio EOP).
- Support mass care facilities as needed.
- Develop, or confirm, by agency, rules of engagement/response, as required by the situation.

d. Prior to the initiation of field support actions (including activities in privately owned facilities) by state-level support agencies, a declaration of a "State of Emergency" or similar enabling action will be made by the governor.

e. In all events, an evaluation of the situation will be made with regard to a possible relocation to, and operation of, an alternate EOC to meet the contingencies of the situation and to provide 24 hour continuity for support functions.

i. Emphasis will upon communications, accommodations, staffing space, and logistical support features.

B. State-Level Operations

1. The authority for consequence management rests with the state assisted by federal agencies as necessary. It entails multiple agency participation, with the provision of technical advice and/or logistical support for both supporting and supported entities, information and educational continuity, combined asset management programs, and an extended partnership approach to both federal and state supporting efforts for affected areas.

2. The organization for consequence management in the state EOC will be based upon the structure outlined in the State of Ohio EOP.

3. The organization is based upon groupings of assigned primary functions. The specifics of an event may cause various agencies representing critical services, to

shift assignments from technical support to primary or lead agency positions (eg, the Department of Agriculture may assume the lead role in an agricultural terror event).

4. The State Coordinating Officer, pre-identified by the Governor, will work with federal offices (FEMA or others as designated) to affect a combined state-federal management effort.

5. Participating agency representatives may need to provide support in locations other than the EOC (e.g., DFOs, Recovery Centers or other sites).

6. Military Support

    a. The Ohio National Guard, 52nd WMD-Civil Support Team (WMDCST), will provide technical assistance and advice in support of WMD incidents.

    b. The Ohio National Guard Homeland Response Force (HRF) provides CBRNE response in the form of search and extraction, decontamination, and limited medical triage/treatment. Additionally, the HRF provides security forces under the National Guard Response Force (NGRF) and Quick Reactions Force (QRF). The HRF is one of two standing HLS/HLD task Forces designated for an initial ONG response to Terrorist and CBRNE incidents and can expand to provide mission command to subordinate units depending on the situation.

    c. Liaison Officers from the Ohio National Guard are provided as required and available to Incident Command Posts (ICP), Unified Commands (UC), Area Commands (AC) and joint field offices.

7. Consequence management will be implemented as follows:

    a. For continuing Credible Threat Advisories/Conditions: Based upon credible threat information, state and federal agencies will advise local governmental agencies regarding additional confirmed threats of terrorism.

        i . The SAIC, serving as the State's primary fusion center, will continue to monitor the situation for emerging threats.

    b. Incident/event-related Consequence Management: If a terrorist event occurs, the Governor may declare a state of emergency and applicable Consequence Management actions will be implemented:

        i. Activation of the state EOC (IAW State of Ohio EOP and EOC SOP).

        ii. Requesting federal assistance in accordance with Federal Response Plan procedures.

iii. An OHS representative will be assigned to the JOC, if established, to monitor events and relay decisions affecting Consequence Management actions to the state EOC. Other state agencies can be dispatched to assist in this function. These agencies could include OEMA, ODH, EPA, ODNR, OSHP, or ODA as required.

iv. State agencies will coordinate the provision of assistance to affected areas to include basic protective action support (mass care, immunizations, treatments, evacuations, relocations, or sheltering, agriculture). Ref: ESF 6, Mass Care, State of Ohio EOP; ESF-7, Resource Support; ESF 11, Agriculture; ESF 8, , and the State of Ohio Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan, 2001.

v. Upon proper request, the 52nd WMD-CST will mobilize, deploy to the affected area and establish operations in conjunction with the Incident Commander.

c. The 52nd WMD-CST will coordinate with the established incident command to assist in assessments, hazard identification and coordination of follow - on forces as necessary.

8. Public Information Support: OSHP and the OHS PIOs will serve in a lead capacity (with Ohio EMA) for the state. Public information specialists from other lead agencies will serve in this capacity when required by the situation.

a. Duties include:

i. The determination of state agency information assistance to include development and response/dissemination methodology and mediums.

ii. Defining specific sharing of public information or educational duties.

iii. The coordination of specific event-related public information actions by lead and support agencies as required.

iv. Monitoring/analysis of media coverage of events and activities as they relate to the situation.

9. Disengagement and Close-Out Actions.

a. In accordance with Unified or Incident Command System concepts, OSHP, OHS and Ohio EMA will coordinate with lead federal and other state agencies for an appropriate date/time for state Consequence Management disengagement.

b. Following disengagement, designated state and local organizations may continue recovery (to include long term hazard monitoring, environmental/personnel decontamination and site restoration) efforts.

c. Post event actions will include debriefings, general agency performance reviews and after-action documentation.

C. Federal-Level Operations

1. For all suspected WMD incidents in which the FBI is involved, the WMD Coordinator (or his/her representative) will initiate a Threat Creditability Evaluation (TCE) with the FBI HQ WMD Directorate.

2. An assessment of the threat, a course of additional response, crime scene operations, and investigation will be determined and executed.

V. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

1. All Support Agencies

As determined to be appropriate to the focus, resources and capabilities of their agencies, and based on the type and level of incident, all Support Agencies to this Plan and other agencies as needed at the time will work jointly or individually to address the following Assignments of Responsibilities.

a. Information Assessment, Monitoring, Collection and Reporting

i. Collect, or assist in the collection and cataloguing of information that could be used to identify terrorist operations from the SAIC, law enforcement, public health, agriculture, public works, transportation, firefighting, emergency medical entities and the private sector. When requested, agencies will maintain a presence at the SAIC to support this responsibility.

ii. Assist in the identification of suspicious circumstances or indicators and warnings associated with planning, support, and operations, related to potential criminal and/or terrorist-related activities.

iii. Gather, catalogue, and preserve evidence for prosecutorial purposes and attribution and maintain chain of custody of evidentiary materials.

iv. Share investigation-related information across jurisdictions and among law enforcement and other agencies.

v. Provide appropriate situational information to the State EOC and the State JIC.

b. Critical Infrastructure Protection

i. When requested, maintain a presence at the SAIC with access to the Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS), to provide a comprehensive and

consistent integrated inventory of a targeted asset and an assessment of assets located within a specified radius of the damaged or destroyed affected asset.

ii. Implement detection measures such as inspection surveillance, employee monitoring, and security counterintelligence.

iii. Conduct consequence analyses to determine which assets, systems, networks, and functions are high consequence and therefore require risk assessment.

iv. Employ vulnerability, risk and threat assessments/profiles on high-consequence assets, systems, networks, and functions for the assessment of critical infrastructure threats.

v. Prioritize high-risk CI/KR for consideration of protective measures.

vi. Implement protective programs and plans to reduce the general level of risk for the highest risk CI/KR and to respond to and recover from specific threat-initiated actions.

vii. Implement programs to defend critical cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions.

2. Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) and/or Ohio Department of Health (ODH)

   a. In coordination with DAS, through the State EOC, support and/or provide human and veterinary medical guidance, laboratories, and pharmaceuticals and supplies in response to disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

   b. Activate the network of veterinary, agricultural, and public health laboratories and other diagnostic facilities for response to bioterrorism incidents.

   c. Provide leadership in public health investigations to determine, in collaboration with law enforcement, human and animal disease source(s)

   d. Report instances of disease and/or contamination that raise the index of suspicion of terrorist or criminal involvement to the FBI.

   e. As able and as needed, dispatch public health or agriculture personnel to location(s) of suspected disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

   f. Assist in the coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the safety and security of food products in retail food establishments, food service operations and institutions.

g. Provide support for, and/or monitor and/or conduct inspections for the safety and security of food, food facilities, and/or the agricultural infrastructure in the affected area.

h. Conduct epidemiological investigations as surveillance reports warrant, and coordinate Federal, State, and local veterinary assistance assets/services.

i. Provide assistance in the search for possible food and agriculture contamination, plant disease or animal disease cases, and use the results from sample analyses to determine the breadth of disease and/or contamination outbreaks.

j. Support and/or conduct laboratory testing, field investigation and product tracing to determine the source, destination, and disposition of adulterated, contaminated or diseased products, plants, or animals.

k. Support and/or provide appropriate information to the public regarding the disposal of potentially contaminated food and/or agricultural products.

l. Assist in the determination of the need for and provide guidance for the embargo, detention, stoppage, condemnation, retention and seizure of food, plants and animals.

m. Assist in the determination of the need for, and provide guidance for the control of identified food products at establishments that are suspected of being contaminated through product recall, administrative detention, and plant closures.

n. Assist in the determination of the need for, and provide guidance for the disposal of contaminated or diseased food, plants or animals.

o. Use standardized protocols to detect emerging infectious agents or possible bioterrorism agents in human clinical specimens, food, animal or environmental samples.

3. Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA)

a. Identify and report on Contagious or Infectious Diseases of animals that are reportable to the Ohio Department of Agriculture and must be reported when a case is suspected.

b. Assist in the coordination of food and agricultural safety response operations and support, and food and agriculture investigation activities.

c. Direct agricultural processes for surveillance and testing and isolation or quarantine in response to threats to agricultural assets and the food supply.

d. Establish and maintain food and agricultural safety response communication systems and coordinate the provision of timely and accurate emergency public information through the Joint Information System (JIS).

4. Ohio Department of Health (ODH)

    a. Assist in the coordination of the examination of suspect deceased suspect patients with local medical examiners and/or coroners.

    b. Work in close partnership with local public health epidemiology, animal health and environmental health entities, and poison control to provide timely data to assure implementation of effective prevention, detection, and control measures, including treatment.

    c. Perform 24/7/365 Bio-Watch analyses and verify reactive Bio-Watch samples.

5. Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) and Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT)

    a. Support the establishment and maintenance of transport systems to assist in the timely delivery and receipt of samples or specimens for laboratory testing.

6. Ohio Department of Public Safety, Division of Ohio Homeland Security, Strategic Information and Analysis Center (OHS-SAIC)

    a. Coordinate information and intelligence between state, local and federal partners

    b. Expeditiously identify, process, analyze, evaluate and disseminate (as appropriate) threat information.

    c. Monitor, process, organize, analyze, evaluate, document, and disseminate appropriate incident related information, intelligence and data in a manner that allows it to be easily visualized and understood.

    d. Support law enforcement information needs